Showing posts with label feminism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label feminism. Show all posts

09 August 2010

The Prop 8 (Perry) Decision for Laymen

I am generally displeased with the quality of most journalism surrounding constitutional law and the cases interpreting and affecting it.  Most of this kind of journalism tends to focus purely on the political (the motivation of the judges, which party will benefit, etc.), and even those few journalists who attempt sincerely and valiantly to explain the decisions (Linda Greenhouse, Dahlia Lithwick) generally write for those who have some degree of training in law or political science.  What remains for consumption of the general public are a few choice and key quotes from the judge or panel's opinion.  While these quotes may convey the essence of the decision, without any background or further exposition, they give readers the impression that these ideas were pulled out of thin air. This tends to decrease confidence in the integrity and wisdom of the judicial branch, and is deleterious to democracy in itself.

  What I want to attempt to do here is describe and explain Judge Vaughn Walker's decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (the "Prop 8 case"), which struck down California's anti-same-sex marriage referendum on Wednesday, in a way that is comprehensible to someone who has never gone to law school (or for that matter, to college).  I have made every effort to refrain from editorializing on the opinion's merits or on same-sex marriage in general.

Since many of you will not want to read all of what will be a quite long post, I have moved the key analysis and conclusions section to the beginning.  If you wish to read the entirety of this piece, please skip to the horizontal line then return here when you reach the end.


Conclusions of Law
Based on the court's Findings of Fact (see below), the court made several conclusions interpreting the caselaw of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process (no state "[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law") and Equal Protection Clauses (no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").  The analyses under each clause involves different legal theories and requirements; however, they are based on the same underlying determination-- that the right to marry is "fundamental."  The "fundamental" status of a right depends on its history and legal tradition.  The status of marriage as a fundamental right has a long pedigree in the United States.  The key question is whether the right sought by plaintiffs is a new right, the right to same-sex marriage, or is the same "right to marry" as has long been recognized.  To determine whether the right claimed by plaintiffs is the same fundamental right, the court examined the precise nature and content of the right sought.  The court found that the chief characteristics of marriage that remain unchanged throughout history are: two parties giving free consent, forming a household, and supporting one another and their dependents.  It determined that neither procreative ability nor specific and distinct gender roles were vital to marriage.  Instead, under modern marriage principles, men and women are recognized as equals and are free to negotiate their own roles on the basis of their individual relationship.  Individuals are granted a space of choice and intimacy in making decisions regarding their marriage, including whom they choose to marry.  After establishing the core values of marriage, the court found that same-sex couples are "situated identically to opposite-sex couples in terms of their ability to perform the rights and obligations of marriage."  Therefore, the court found that same-sex couples did not seek recognition of a new right, but rather of the same right to marry as is currently enjoyed by opposite-sex couples.

Having determined that the right to marry sought by plaintiffs was fundamental, the Due Process Clause prohibits government from burdening the exercise of that right unless it can show that the government has a "compelling interest" in burdening it and that the law is carefully limited and designed ("narrowly tailored") to accomplish that objective.  [Under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, this test is known as "strict scrutiny" and is the most stringent of the constitutional tests.]  Furthermore, the court recognized that "fundamental rights may not be submitted to [a] vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."  The court found that Prop 8 could not meet even the much lower test [known as "rational basis review"] of showing any legitimate government interest in preventing same-sex couples from marrying.  The potential government interests identified by proponents are discussed below.

The Equal Protection Clause asks whether the government creates a classification that targets a "suspect class" (a class with a history of discrimination that may be unable to defend itself from such discrimination) or burdens a fundamental right.  Plaintiffs argued, and the court accepted, that Prop 8 discriminated in allowing individuals to exercise a fundamental right both on the basis of gender (men could marry women, but could not marry other men, etc.) and on sexual orientation. These categories are both constitutionally protected, but courts have not subjected such classifications to strict scrutiny (i.e. they are not a suspect class).  Nevertheless, the court found that gays and lesbians are the type of minority that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to protect, due to their history of discrimination based on false stereotypes.  While the gender classification applies to heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, Prop 8 eliminates a right "only a gay man or a lesbian would exercise," therefore there was a classification uniquely damaging to homosexuals.  As was the case with the Due Process Clause analysis cited above, the court found that the proponents could not even show any legitimate government interest to which Prop 8 was rationally related-- it could not pass even the weakest constitutional test.  

The court went on to analyze rationales offered by the proponents as legitimate government interests that Prop 8 could advance, namely: (1) preserving "traditional marriage"; (2) proceeding with caution in enacting social change; (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting; (4) protecting the freedom of those who oppose same-sex marriage; and (5) distinguishing between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.  The court reviewed these rationales extensively, but determined in each case that a) that the rationale was not a legitimate one for government (e.g. tradition alone); b) that the rationale was not reasonable given the evidence provided (i.e. that same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples were fundamentally the same and that children were not adversely affected by being raised with two same-sex parents); or c) that Prop 8 would actually produce effects that damaged the interests identified by proponents (i.e. that the purpose was not reasonably related to what Prop 8 would actually cause).

Having reviewed and rejected all of the proposed interests, the court inferred, as supported by evidence in the trial record, that Prop 8's true motivation was not a legitimate government interest, but a "private moral view" about the immorality and inferiority of same-sex couples.  The court then cited past Supreme Court cases stating that such beliefs are "not a proper basis on which to legislate."

Having found no "rational basis" for the law, but instead only an impermissible moral disapproval at the heart of Prop 8, the court declared Prop 8 unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

_______________________________________________________________________________


Facts
I will not rehearse the facts of the Prop 8 saga, since I assume that they will be well-known to any who have an interest in reading what is to follow.  What I will say is that in May 2008, the California Supreme Court held that California counties were required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  In November of that same year, Proposition 8 revised the California Constitution to provide that marriage was between one man and one woman.  In the intervening period, approximately 18,000 same-sex couples took advantage of the availability of marriage licenses.  Those marriages were unaffected by Prop 8.

Grounds for Challenge
The plaintiffs, who are same-sex couples who had been denied marriage licenses following the passage of Prop 8, challenged the law under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution.  The proponents of Prop 8, who intervened in the case in lieu of the various state governmental officials who were named defendants (who had refused to defend the law), defended the law on the grounds that same-sex marriage would effect certain negative consequences that California had an interest in preventing by prohibiting the marriage of same-sex couples.

Review of Evidence
The court reviewed the testimony that had been provided at trial.  [In the American federal court system, the trial court (or district court) hears the evidence and makes certain findings of fact.  Appellate courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, may review the evidence produced at trial, but do not repeat the trial itself.  Generally, such courts are confined to determining whether the trial court correct interpreted and applied the law to the facts as it found them.]  Plaintiffs and proponents put on both lay (non-expert) and expert witnesses.  The lay witnesses were primarily composed of the plaintiff couples, who testified as to why they wanted to be married, and persons who had been involved in the "Yes on 8" campaign (or ProtectMarriage), who testified regarding their efforts and motivations in opposing same-sex marriage.  The trial judge had earlier explained at trial that he wished to have a full review of the status of gay and lesbians in society and the effects that same-sex marriage could potentially have on homosexual and heterosexual marriages.  Thus, the expert witnesses ran the gamut from history, psychology, human development, economics, social epidemiology, and political science.  The range and amount of testimony provided cannot even be effectively summarized in a space such as this (the opinion was 136 pages long), though I will provide some highlights below.  However, the judge found that plaintiff's witnesses were generally credible in their testimony, and that proponents' experts lacked credibility.  The judge stated his belief that the proponents had generally failed to provide any credible evidence that supported their bare assertions of negative consequences that would result from allowing same-sex marriage.

Plaintiffs' Expert Testimony
The plaintiffs' evidence consisted in part of the following ten points.  Due to the fact that the judge adopted many of the expert's conclusions in his findings of fact, I have identified those findings by number.  Plaintiffs' experts argued that:
(1) marriage in the US has always been a secular (or civic) institution and has undergone a number of changes and transformations over the course of American history (Finding #19);

(2) gays and lesbians are subject to widespread private and public discrimination and stigma, based on negative stereotypes of homosexuals that are without basis in fact (Findings #58, 67, 74-76, 78);

(3) same-sex couples and the state of California (and its cities and counties) have been subject to serious economic harm as a result of Prop 8 (Findings #64-66);

(4) same-sex couples are in all important respects similar to opposite-sex couples (Finding #48);

(5) allowing same-sex marriage would not have adverse effects on opposite-sex marriage (Finding #55);

(6) marriage has important benefits for the couple and any children raised in that marriage (Findings #50, 56);

(7) the stigma on gays and lesbians has negative effects on their mental health;

(8) homosexuality is a personality trait that is not chosen and is not amenable to change through therapy;

(9) children raised by same-sex couples are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual couples (Finding #69); and

(10) gays and lesbians do not possess a meaningful degree of political power.

Proponents' Expert Testimony
The proponents did not call many of their expert witnesses as they had originally planned.  Their initial justification for this choice is that the experts feared exposing themselves to risks to their personal safety due to their testimony.  However, after publication of the proceedings was prevented by a Supreme Court intervention, the plaintiffs still refused to call their witnesses.  Plaintiffs offered the previously recorded testimony of two of proponents' experts.  Those experts concluded that "religion lies at the heart of the hostility" against gays and lesbians and there was no evidence that children raised by same-sex couples fared worse than children raised by opposite-sex couples.

The proponents did offer the testimony of two expert witnesses.  One of those witnesses, David Blankenhorn, was the founder and president of the Institute for American Values, a family values think tank.  The court dismissed Blankenhorn's testimony for his lack of qualifications or support for his conclusions.  He lacked formal training in the relevant fields, had no peer-reviewed publications, and his conclusions were not produced using reliable methods (i.e. scientific methods).  Blankenhorn had testified that the state had a interest in preserving opposite-sex marriage in order to regulate the bearing and raising of children.  This was important because children raised by married, biological parents do better than children in other environments.  However, the court found that the evidence he used to arrive at this conclusion only compared married, biological parents with other living situations that were not the equivalent of married same-sex parents (e.g. single parents, step families).  Blankenhorn also testified that three universal rules that governed marriage: that it was between a man and a woman, that only two spouses were involved, and that sex was involved. Finally, Blankenhorn testified that recognizing same-sex marriage would lead to the "deinstitutionalization" of marriage, which he defined as out-of-wedlock marriage, non-marital cohabitation, rising divorce rates, etc.  The court found that he produced no credible evidence to support these conclusions.  Besides the general lack of reliability in this opinions, the court found that Blankenhorn's testimony contradicted his own opinions in several respects.  Proponent's second expert, Kenneth Miller, is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.  The purpose of Miller's testimony was to show that gays and lesbians enjoyed significant political power.  The court found that, because Miller had failed to consider key evidence and was not familiar with gay and lesbian politics, his testimony should be discounted.  The court further found that Miller's previous writings contradicted his testimony as a witness for the proponents.

Findings of Fact
In addition to those findings of fact listed above under Plaintiff's Expert Testimony, the court made certain other findings of fact on which it based its legal conclusions.  While space does not permit me to do so here, the court identified specific citations to the trial record, including documents and testimony offered by experts for both sides, that supported his findings.  These findings include:
(1) CA, like other states, did not require that couples be willing or able to procreate in order to obtain a marriage license (Finding #21);

(2) Marriage requires free consent of the parties (Finding #23);

(3) Marriage has undergone significant changes in the course of American history, including the elimination of racial restrictions, the elimination of status of women as property of her husband, and the equalization of gender roles in marriage.  These changes have not weakened marriage. (Findings #24-28, 33);

(4) Under current law, marital partners have equal obligations to one another and their dependents (Finding #32)

(5) Marriage is a state recognition with many purposes, including family stability, legitimating children, and establishing support obligations, and is used to provide benefits to certain couples (Findings #34-37);

(6) Marriage is good for the health and material well-being of those involved, including children (Findings #38-41);

(7) Same-sex behavior has a long history, though a separate identity for homosexuals developed in the late 19th century (Finding #42);

(8) Sexual orientation is an enduring pattern of behavior, stable through adulthood, and is a fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of an individual's identity.  It is not a choice and cannot be change through decision or therapy (Findings #43-44, 46);

(9) CA law already allows gays and lesbians to become parents (Finding #49);

(10) Domestic partnership is not equal to marriage, due to different symbolic meanings and benefits, and is inferior to marriage (Findings #52-54);

(11) Prop 8 requires unequal treatment and inferior treatment of same-sex couples vis a vis opposite-sex couples (Findings #59-60);

(12) Prop 8 codifies distinct traditional gender roles in marriage (Finding #61);

(13) Prop 8 does not affect the First Amendment rights of those opposed to same-sex marriage (Finding #62);

(14) Prop 8 does not affect other constitutional rights (Finding #63);

(15) Gender and sexual orientation of parents, r a child's genetic relationship to parents, are not factors in a child's adjustment.  Opposite-sex couples are not required to produce well-adjusted children (Findings #69-73);

(16) Religious beliefs in the sinfulness or inferiority of homosexual relationships are harmful to gays and lesbians (Finding #77); and

(17) The campaign to pass Prop 8 was based on never-articulated and vague fears about homosexuals and stereotypes (Findings #79-80).


[If you have read this far, please return to the top and read the "Conclusions of Law" section.]

02 November 2009

Demise of the BYU Women's Research Institute

On October 29, 2009, Brigham Young University announced that it would be closing the Women's Research Institute, the program which housed the university's women's studies minor. I am fortunate enough to know someone who was previously affiliated with the WRI -- my wife Ariel, who taught at the WRI in the summer of 2006. I have invited her to share her thoughts on this event.

Three years ago, I had the opportunity to take a break from my Ph.D. program at Duke and spend a summer as visiting faculty at the Women’s Research Institute at Brigham Young University. Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, director of the Women’s Research Institute, invited me to teach Introduction to Women’s Studies, the core course requirement for the women’s studies minor, during BYU’s spring term. In need of both teaching experience and money, I agreed to teach the course even though I had a number of reservations about doing so. First of all, I had been a student at BYU for 5 years and had never even known they taught women’s studies courses at all. Was anyone going to enroll? But more importantly, I was fresh out of a graduate women’s studies course at Duke, an institution with a “real” women’s studies department and an active feminist agenda. I did not want to teach anything but a serious women’s studies syllabus—something I could teach at any university that would deal with touchy issues such as female sexuality. And was I even allowed to say “feminism” at BYU without ending up in my bishop’s office? Would it be like my previous two summers of teaching Book of Mormon in the religion department, where veteran religion professors regularly snuck into the back of my class to evaluate my orthodoxy?


I was glad to find that my fears were largely unfounded. Ballif-Spanvill, a highly intelligent and well-educated woman with the kindly appearance of an elementary school teacher, had mastered the art of treading lightly around the powers that be in order to keep the WRI largely autonomous. Because of her political savvy, the WRI was a haven of academic freedom for feminist scholars such as myself. While there, I was given free reign over what I could teach, the materials I could use, and the topics I could discuss. Ballif-Spanvill even tried to help me get through the BYU “honor code” computer filters to conduct my research on pornography. But what amazed me most about the WRI is the freedom I felt there not only as a feminist but also as a LDS scholar. While discussing issues such as sexual abuse, lesbianism, body image, and sex work, I was able to speak more openly and confidently about women’s issues than I ever had before because of the religious demographic of the classroom. While we discussed many of the same subjects that would have been part of the curriculum at any other university, there was also a place for testimony and for the reconciliation of fact with faith. It was a unique experience and one that I will never forget.


I had toyed with the idea of returning to the WRI one day when BYU was willing to put more resources into women’s studies and would finally fund some regular professorships in the WRI. Instead, the administration has decided to eliminate the WRI altogether, supposedly “streamlining and strengthening” the women’s studies minor by relocating it to the sociology department. I am skeptical. While the elimination of such a relatively-unpopular minor may seem like the logical choice in the midst of a serious economic recession, the administration of BYU must consider the long-term results of this choice. Women’s studies is not only a department but a symbol of social progress and a commitment to equality at universities around the world. It can be of no coincidence that the WRI was founded in 1978, only shortly after LDS African Americans were allowed to hold the priesthood and in the midst of debate over the Equal Rights Amendment, an era in which both BYU and the Church were seeking ways in which to express their dedication to racial and gender equality. Has the need for such visual symbolism ceased in this time of Proposition 8? Hardly.

In emphasizing the symbolic value of the WRI, I do not wish to demean the actual academic value of women’s studies at BYU. The WRI has served over the past thirty-one years to pursue specific goals central not only to the feminist agenda but also to the Gospel of Jesus Christ: to promote the education of women, to recognize and eliminate the exploitation of women, and to end violence and abuse of women. In light of these considerations, one might even argue that the goals and achievements of the WRI are of greater social, political, and even eternal importance than those of most other departments at BYU. Yet in eliminating the WRI and burying the women’s studies minor in the sociology department, the administration is marginalizing these aims and reinforcing to the world (once again) that money-making lawyers and accountants glorify God better than engaged citizens sensitized to social injustice and committed to change.


19 July 2008

Faith and Knowledge Conference 2009 - Call for Papers

CALL FOR PAPERS

"Reconciliations and Reformulations":
A Conference for LDS Graduate Students in Religious Studies
Harvard University, February 20-21, 2009

Many Latter-day Saints experience their scholarship and their religion as clashing cultures, each with its competing values and contradictory conclusions. Religious studies students especially struggle to reconcile their faith and the knowledge they acquire in graduate school. The forms this reconciliation takes (including the failure to achieve reconciliation) become crucial episodes in a student's life history. The purpose of the Faith and Knowledge Conference for 2009 is to provide a forum for exploring these attempts at reconciliation.

We invite paper proposals from graduate students in religious studies and other related fields in the following four categories:

I. Gender and Sexuality
The academic discipline of religion is interacting more and more with methodologies and theories borrowed from gender and sexuality studies. As LDS scholars, to what extent do we engage in or disregard these methodologies? Can we take more expansive views of homosexuality, feminism, and other related issues than Mormon theology traditionally does without compromising our faith? Can feminist theology, queer theory, and similar approaches be useful to LDS scholars or must they be rejected altogether? How do more traditional viewpoints inform our academic scholarship, and how may the more expansive contemporary views of such issues inform both our academic scholarship and our understanding of the Gospel? Is reconciliation possible (or even needed) between these academic paradigms and the faith of the LDS scholar?

II. Scripture
LDS scholars commonly perceive a tension between "academic" and "devotional" approaches to scripture. Can scholarly methodologies (the historical-critical method, literary criticism, etc.) be usefully incorporated into the study or interpretation of LDS scripture, both ancient and modern, or must they be abandoned or subordinated to faith-based understandings? What investments do LDS scholars of scripture bring to the academic table and in what ways do they manifest themselves in productive or unproductive ways in LDS scholarship? Can academic approaches to the Bible be helpful in the study of revealed scripture, and if so, do they require some kinds of reconciliations or transformations? Is there and/or should there be a unique LDS scriptural hermeneutic, and what would it look like?

III. Pluralism
The approaches of religions to their own truth-claims may be divided into three categories: exclusivist religions, which assert that theirs is the sole bearer of truth and salvation; inclusivist religions, which recognize that other traditions possess enough truth to qualify them for salvation; and finally, pluralist religions, which hold that all traditions are equal paths to God. In a time of globalization, Latter-day Saint interactions with other religions, both Christian and non-Christian, raise questions about our view of ourselves. As we learn to appreciate the depth of other religious traditions, we wonder if our exclusivist view on truth is sustainable and defensible. How do we react to the theological and political dilemmas that exclusive claims to salvation through Jesus Christ or through Mormon rituals entail? Can a Mormon pluralism exist, or must we take on the burden of exclusivism?

IV. The Place of Religious Scholarship in the Church
Religious scholars and scholarship occupy an ambiguous role in the Church. Religious scholarship is cited when it supports Church teachings but rejected when it suggests that Church positions may be problematic. Moreover, the scholar who raises questions of this find falls under suspicion. Given current Church culture, what can an LDS scholar of religion bring to the table? Can a scholar utilize his/her tools and scholarship in a pastoral role? Can LDS religious scholars work to remove the stigma in the Church associated with the academic study of religion, and especially the academic study of Mormonism? Specifically, in what ways can areas of religious scholarship contribute positively to the spiritual and cultural life of the Church?

Panelist papers or presentations should last approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Short proposals (no more than 250 words) should be submitted via the conference website (http://www.faithandknowledge.org/submissions.php) by OCTOBER 1, 2008.
Presenters will be notified by December 1, 2008. Conference participants will be eligible to apply for financial assistance with travel and lodging expenses.
Please send further inquiries about to the conference to
org@faithandknowledge.org.